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POLLUTION RIGHTS: Do MARKETABLE ALLOWANCES TAKE AWAY
OUR COMMON LAW REMEDIES?
KRISTIN M. MURPHY

The United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
recently has promulgated regulations' under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 19902 that implement an innovative program of
marketable pollution allowances. The program targets the reduction of
sulfur dioxide ("SO 2") emissions in furtherance of the goals3 of the acid
rain control plan of Title IV of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
The S02 program allocates to each "affected unit" (generally, fossilfuel-burning utility plants) an amount of allowances (authorizations to emit
a ton of SO2) equal to the unit's annual S02 emissions tonnage limitation.4
The unit will be able to pollute an amount equal to or less than the amount
authorized by the purchased allowances; unused allowances may be
banked for future use or sold to any purchaser.5 Discretion thus is given
to the unit's owner to determine the most cost-effective means to pollute
within the established limits. Newly constructed units must either purchase
unused allowances from existing units, or purchase allowances through
annual auctions held by the EPA.
The S02 program is also part of a policy initiative attempting to
shift the focus of environmental protection from pure governmental
regulation to economic incentives. In fact, after the announcement of the
program, the Chicago Board of Trade created a private market for these
sulfur dioxide emission rights." While economists believe that allowance
trading will lead to cost-efficient pollution reduction, critics have

' B.A. University of North Carolina, 1989; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School of Law,
College of William and Mary, 1992.
1. 56 Fed. Reg. 65,592 (1991).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (a)(1) (1991).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (b) (1991).
4. The limit is found in the Clean Air Act at 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1991).
5. 56 Fed. Reg. 65,592 (1991).
6. Id.
7. Peter Passell, A New Commodity to be Traded: Government Permitsfor Pollution,"
N. Y. TIMES, July 17 1991 at Al. Individuals now will be able to speculate not only on
stocks and bonds, but on the rise and fall of the value of pollution rights. The Exchange
will seek to set up a futures market, enabling individuals to speculate on pollution rights
up to three years in advance. The estimated price of an allowance (equal to one ton of
sulfur dioxide emissions) ranges from $400 up to, but not exceeding, $2000. Id.
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questioned the underlying motives of the program's proponents:
When it comes to finding innovative ways to make a buck,
you've got to hand it to our neighbors across the border... who
else would think of setting up a market where "pollution rights"
are traded like gold, pork bellies or any other commodity? Who,
but those consummate practitioners of pure capitalism, those
faithful disciples of the Great Free Market, the Americans.!
Whether the "Gret Free Market" adequately will address
environmental concerns remains to be seen. Nevertheless, EPA's SO2
program has opened a new era of air pollution regulation and raises the
possibility of the extension of the marketable allowance approach to other
air pollutants.9
This article raises two issues that must be addressed in light of the
new marketable allowances approach to air pollution control. First, is the
sale of such "pollution rights" reconcilable with notions of public rights in
natural resources? Furthermore, how do statutory "pollution rights" affect
common law remedies for injuries resulting from air pollution?
PUBLIC RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES

Legal theories concerning the public interest in natural resources
recognize that certain resources such as air are so vital to the public that
their availability should "be preserved for the whole of the populace. "' 1
Roman law recognized the air and the sea as public property; natural law
also considered "sacred things" (churches) and wild animals as belonging

8. Peter Matthews, Smog Futures Innovative Way to Clean Air, THE TORONTO STAR,
July 22, 1991 at BI.
9. For example, the allowance program could expand to include all air pollutants for
which there are national ambient air quality standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1991). The
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS") were established under the 1970 Clean

Air Act to determine "safe" levels for air pollution. H. LANDSBERG ET AL., ENERGY:
TwENTY YEARS 374-83 (1979). Pollutants must be included on the list for
NAAQS if the pollutant has an adverse effect on public health and welfare, and the
pollutant is emitted from numerous and diverse sources. Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
10. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 484 (1970).

THE NEXT
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to everyone." Some modem states even have incorporated the public
2
interest in natural resources into their constitutions and codes.'
Two public rights theories are useful in the protection of certain
natural resources -- the public trust doctrine and the identification of a
resource as inherently public property.
Public Trust Doctrine

The public trust doctrine mandates that natural resources, such as
navigable waters and public lands, be held in trust for the public by the
government.13 Air is another natural resource within the scope of the
doctrine."' The government, as trustee, must protect the resources from
private uses, regardless of the value that the private uses may create."
The resources are to be maintained in "common and renewable form.""
The public trust doctrine presumes that nonconsumptive uses of a resource

11. Stephen A. DeLeo, PhillipsPetroleum Co. v. Mississippi and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Strengthening Sovereign Interest in Tidal Property, 38 CATH. U.L. REv. 571,
574 (1989); See generally Sax, supra note 10.
12. For example, Rhode Island and Connecticut have adopted the following language:
[It is the] duty of the general assembly to provide for the conservation
of the air, land, water, plant, animal, mineral and other resources of the
state, and to adopt all means necessary and proper by law to protect the
natural environment of the people of the state ....
R.I. CONST. Art. 1 § 17.
DECLARATION OF POLICY. It is hereby found and declared that
there is a public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the
state of Connecticut and that each person is entitled to the protection,
preservation and enhancement of the same. It is further found and
declared that it is in the public interest to provide all persons with an
adequate remedy to protect the air, water and other natural resources
from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction.
CONN. GEN. STATE.

§ 22a-15 (1990).

13. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
14. In order to apply the public trust doctrine to a given resource, three conditions
must be met. First, the public must possess a legal right to the resource. Second, this
public right must be enforceable against the government. Third, concerns for
environmental quality must be consistent with the public right in the resource. Sax, supra
note 10, at 474. Air arguably meets this test. The air, under Roman law, was considered
within the scope of the public trust doctrine. DeLeo, supra note 11, at 574.
15. Heidi Wendel, RestorationAs the Economically Efficient Remedy for Damage to
Publicly Owned Natural Resources, 91 COLUM. L.REv. 430, 441 (1991).

16. Id.
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are the most valuable uses. 17 The economic efficiency arguments
supporting private use are irrelevant under this doctrine;' rather, the
preservation of the resource is the goal.
The government, as trustee, must obey three restrictions on the use
of the resource. 9 First, the property must be used for a public purpose
and be held available to the public." Second, the property cannot be sold
Third, the property must also be
for monetary reimbursement.2
uses.'
for
particular
maintained
The government's public trust duties were defined further in Illinois
CentralRailroadCompany v. Illinois.23 In a dispute over state regulation
of tidal lands, the United States Supreme Court held that if the state
legislature is found to have acted in violation of the trust, the legislative
action is void.' The Court noted that while the state retained sovereignty
over trust lands, the state could regulate the trust lands only as long as the
regulation occurred "without substantial impairment of the interest of the
Other courts have held that the government may
public . . . . "
determine the direction of public trust lands within its jurisdiction, as long
as the uses promote the public interest.'
Under this interpretation of the public trust doctrine, the
government may determine the uses of the air, held in public trust, as long
as the uses promote the public interest. But what is the public interest in
the air? The most basic and important public use is respiration, and
presumably the public is interested in unlimited access to clean air.
However, the sale of pollution rights, an indirect purchase of the air,

17. Id. at 440. The most valuable use recognizes the intrinsic value, or inherent
value and moral significance of the resource, rather than simply recognizing the
instrumental or use value of the resource. Id. at 444.
18. Id. at 441.
19. Sax, supra note 10, at 477.
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
24. Id.
25. Id. See also LYNDA LEE BuTLER & MARGIT LIVINGSTON, Development of
Public Trust Doctrine, in VIRGINIA TIDAL AND COSTAL LAW, 105, 127 (1988).
26. DeLeo, supra note 11, at 588. For further discussion, See Stone, Public Rights
in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, 1 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS 177, 193-205 (Robert Clark ed. 1967); State v. Lyon, 29 Cal. 3d 210, cert. denied
454 U.S. 865 (1981); State v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 628, 630 (Wisc.

Ct. App. 1979).
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necessarily conflicts with the government's duties under the public trust
doctrine."
Air as Public Property
Traditionally, air has been regarded as a "plenteous good" worthy
of protection as public property.2 Because of its plentiful and boundless
characteristics, air usually is considered to be too difficult to reduce to
private ownership, so it is "left open to the public at large." 2' However,
the trend towards privatization of the air through the creation and
distribution of pollution rights (such as the SO2 program) calls into doubt
the characterization of air as a plenteous good?3
Yet the strong public interest in air as a natural resource indicates
the impropriety of establishing an entirely private ownership scheme for
air. Instead, air should be conserved as an "inherently public property."31
As such, air should be managed and owned by the unorganized public,
which possesses claims to the resource superior to private parties and the
government? 2

The government's role regarding inherently public property should
be limited to stepping in to maintain public use rights when common

management fails? 3 The public remains the beneficial owner of the
resources and the government's duty is to protect the public from
privatization efforts that may result in a holdout, thereby denying public
use of the resource?' This theory is similar to natural resources
27. Although industry certainly does promote the public interest, it seems unlikely
that the externalities of industial products, namely pollution, could in any way serve the
public interest. The public does benefit from jobs and industry growth, however, these
same benefits can and should be derived from non-polluting sources. The public interest

would be best served by minimal pollution; although that may be costly, the state has a
duty to protect the air for its citizens.
28. See Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U.CH. L. REV. 711, 718 (1986).

29. Id. at 717.
30. Id. at 718 n.29.
31. See Rose, supra note 28.

32. Id. at 749.
33. Id. The term "use" will refer to the public's use of air for respiration purposes.

34. Id. This theory is best explained in terms of land use and ownership. A holdout
occurs when one property owner refuses to sell his parcel that is included in a larger area
needed for public use. Id. at 750. An example of a holdout may occur during the
construction of a highway. Each affected landowner will be required to sell his parcel of
land to the government to allow public access. If a threat of holdout is present, the
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conservation under the public trust doctrine 5 where, as here, the public
maintains an ownership interest superior to that of the government.
There is little fear that a private person or group somehow will
acquire absolute ownership of the air. Nevertheless, the implementation
of the S02 program of marketable pollution allowances clearly marks the
beginning of the privatization of the air, an initiative in conflict with the
government's obligation regarding inherently public property. Foreseeable
manipulation of the SO 2 program could lead to the concentration of
allowances in the hands of a few large companies. Such privatization thus
raises the specter of future monopolization, or at least exclusive use by
polluters, relegating to inferior status the public interest in clean air for
respiration.
COMMON LAW CLAIMS:

PROPERTY "TAKEN" THROUGH PREEMPTION

A recent study in New York City produced startling results: thirty
minutes of jogging in NYC was found to have the carbon monoxide
equivalent of smoking twenty cigarettes." People need a form of redress
against these nonconsensual pollution emissions. Remedies under common
law theories of battery, trespass, and nuisance are appropriate for pollutionrelated injuries. Such common law claims arguably are property interests;
yet by creating pollution rights, the federal government is taking these

interests through the doctrine of preemption.
Common Law Claimsfor Pollution-RelatedInjuries

A "spillover effect" occurs when the use of property affects the
health or well-being of others.38 In terms of pollution, spillover effects

develop in different ways. For instance, the use of a polluter's land can
result in pollution restricting the use of other's land. Also, a person's use

government may exercise its power of eminent domain to ensure that the fair market value
of the land is given in exchange for its use. Id. The fear of holdouts is one justification
for governmental regulation in areas where the market, manipulated by a landowner, may
fail to produce a fair price.
35. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
36. Rose, supra note 28, at 721.
37. W. David Slawson, The Right to Protectionfrom Air Pollution, 59 S.CAL L.

REv. 672, 697 (1986).
38. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property,and Public Rights, 81 YALE LAW J.
149, 162 (1971).

1992]

MARKETABLE POLLUTION RIGHTS

of a common resource can affect the use of others who share an equal
claim to the resource.39 Common resources potentially affected by
spillover include land, air, water, and visual prospects, or landscapes.
Air pollution may be both a visual prospect spillover, and a
spillover restricting use of another's land or property. For example, the
current controversy surrounding pollution over the Grand Canyon is a
visual prospect spillover."' Pollution can damage the landscape by
forcing smoke, noise, and large smokestacks upon all viewers. Pollution
restricts people's lives by forcing them to move if the pollution is severe,
and restricts people's lives by causing illness.
Of course, polluters could argue that pollution still allows people
to use air (although dirty) and does not restrict the public's access to the
air, or that pollution does not necessarily stop a landowner from using his
land. Nevertheless, pollution limits the options available to landowners
and clearly restricts public access to the landscape and clean air necessary
for good health.
Moreover, extreme pollution could render land
completely useless for people, animals, and plants.
Use of property that has spillover effects may be constitutionally
restrained regardless of the economic loss to the owner.4 ' One form of
restraint would be to encourage citizens to sue for pollution-related
injuries. Such suits act as an economic incentive for polluters to limit
their pollution, especially when injunctions and high damage claims are
awarded regularly.
Suits for pollution-related injuries should be based on the plaintiff's
right to common law claims of battery, trespass, and nuisance. 2 A
common law claim for battery intuitively seems to accrue to the citizen
personally injured by air pollution caused by a specific source. Similarly,
a trespass may occur when pollution passes over land or is absorbed into
the land without prior consent from the owner. Pollution trespass violates
an essential idea of property: our "absolute right to exclude." 3 In

39. Id. at 161-162.
40. See EPA Offers Congratulations on Navajo Accord, PUBLIC UTIIJTlES
FORTNIGHTLY, September 15, 1991, at 23.
41. Sax, supra note 38 at 161. If the polluter were to be restricted from a use that
does not produce any such spillover effects, compensation would need to be given. Id.

at 164.
42. \Slawson, supra note 37, at 769.
43. Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1829, 1837 (1986)(reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EmiENT DOMAIN (1985)). This reasoning may also be used to defend an
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addition, nuisance law evolved to protect plaintiffs from odors, dust,
smoke, and vibrations from neighboring landowners; injunctions were
granted to abate the "pollution."'
Common Law Claims as Property
A citizen's rights to redress for pollution-related battery, trespass,
and nuisance harms are property interests. 45 These rights are important
protection against air pollution, a violent, injurious poison."
The theories of reliance, expectation, and security justify
considering redress for such harm as a property interest. 47 A person
always expects and relies on the government to protect them from
violence. Insofar as pollution may be equated with violence, poisoning by
pollution is an evil from which many expect to be protected. Security in
one's home is also a paramount interest. A person does not expect to have
to move because a plant occupies a nearby area. People rely on the
common law claims of nuisance, for example, to be able to obtain an
injunction or abatement of the pollution.
Preemption of Common Law Claims
Since no federal common law rights have been established in the
regulation of air pollution,48 only state common law provides protection

argument that pollution is a taking of our physical property. Pollution may limit the uses
we have of our land and render it uninhabitable.
44. Nuisance law is based on the doctrine sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
meaning "so use your own as not to injure another's." The presumptive remedy for a
prevailing plaintiff was the entitlement to an injunction. Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated
Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IowA L. REV. 775 (1986).
45. Slawson, supra note 37, at 769.
46. Id. at 770.
47. Frank I. Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH. AND LEE L.
REV. 1097, 1103 (1981).
48. Only Congress has the authority to set standards of law, yet two situations exist
when courts may fashion federal common law: 1)a federal rule of decision is "necessary
to protect uniquely federal interests," and 2) Congress has given the courts the power to
develop substantive law. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dept. of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1201

(9th Cir. 1988).

The Clean Air Act is a comprehensive statute regulating pollution. Under the
Act, the EPA has the authority to determine which pollutants are dangerous and what
levels may be maintained to protect the welfare of the public. Id. at 1202. However,
Congress did not authorize the courts to develop substantive law of air pollution because
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for persons injured by air pollution.49 Such remedies may arise under tort
theories of battery, trespass, and nuisance. EPA's marketable allowances
program, however, may preempt these common law claims, leaving
poisoned citizens without their property right to redress for pollutionrelated injuries.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that state laws
must give way to federal laws that come in direct conflict.50 Preemption
can apply to state law rooted in statute, regulation, or common law rule.5 1
The state law will be impliedly preempted if it "interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal." 52
A recent case, Papas v. Upjohn Co.,53 held that the federal government,
through the EPA, possesses the authority to regulate pesticide labels under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA").5 A
section of FIFRA provides that the states may not impose any

it is not necessary to protect "uniquely federal interests." Id. The definition of "uniquely
federal interests" includes those narrow interests involving interstate and international
disputes involving conflicting rights of the states or relations with foreign countries. Id.
In addition, under the Clean Air Act states have the primary responsibility for
ensuring air quality within the state. Id. at 1203. Thus, neither of the two exceptions
applies to enable the courts to fashion federal common law under the Clean Air Act.
49. Of course, the savings clause of the Clean Air Act does not restrict a person's
statutory or common-law right to seek enforcement of an emission standard. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(e) (1988)(a "savings clause" preserves or saves other rights not addressed in the
Clean Air Act). In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third
Circuit held that state common law damage actions can create obstacles to the
accomplishment of congressional purposes. This reasoning also was adopted by the
Eleventh Circuit. Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313 (11th Cir. 1987).
50. The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, clause 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

For a discussion of federal preemption in the environmental field, see Dion
Hayes, Emasculating State Environmental Enforcement: The Supreme Court's Selective
Adoption of the Preemption Doctrine, 16 WM. & MARY J. ENvTL L. 31 (1991).
51. Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 822, 825-826 (11th Cir. 1989).
52. International Paper Company v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1978).
53. 926 F.2d 1019, 1024 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
54. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (1980).
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requirements in addition to or different from those required by FIFRA 5
Through this comprehensive statute and regulations, the EPA approves
labels for each pesticide.
The court further held in Papas that FIFRA impliedly preempted
state common law tort actions based on labeling claims.5 ' The court
perceived the federal government as occupying the entire field of labeling
regulation, "leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law, even
In addition, the court
by means of state common law tort actions."'
noted that any damage awards for injuries would conflict with the federal
law because the EPA has provided the labels as an adequate means to
protect the public."
Similar to these labeling cases, the federal government has provided
for air quality standards as a means to protect the public from harm. The
Clean Air Act contains two sections governing the establishment of
national ambient air quality standards ("NAAQS").-" The Clean Air Act
instructs the Administrator of the EPA to identify pollutants which may
reasonably be anticipated to "endanger public health or welfare.IW Also,
the Administrator is instructed to propose and promulgate primary and
secondary NAAQS for statutorily-listed pollutants. 6" The standards are
based on providing for an "adequate margin of safety" for the public health
(primary standard), and protecting public welfare from adverse effects
62
caused by the presence of the pollutants in the air (secondary standard).

55. 7 U.S.C.A. § 136v(b) (1980).
56. Papas, 926 F.2d at 1024.
57. Id.
58. Id. The first case to hold that state common law remedies are preempted by
FIFRA was Fitzgeraldv. Mallinckrodt,Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987). In that
case, the court relied on Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987), cert.
den., 488 U.S. 1030 (1989), which came to a similar conclusion regarding the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1984). (The Supreme
Court recently granted certiorari to determine the question of whether state tort claims,
based on a failure to warn theory, are preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising AcL See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 893 F.2d 541, cert. granted
(1991)). These courts believed that common law claims would serve as obstacles to the
purposes of federal legislation because the manufacturers would be compelled to change
a product's label after an adverse jury verdict. But see Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.,
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1062 (1985).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7409 (1991).
60. Id. § 7408.
61. Id. § 7409.
62. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dept. of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1988).
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Congress passed the Clean Air Act intending to protect the public
from harmful pollutants,63 as determined by the Administrator of the
EPA. The NAAQS and other air pollution initiatives such as the SO2
program may be viewed as adequate means of enforcement, eliminating the
need for common law remedies. Indeed, common law remedies may
conflict with the purposes of the Clean Air Act. 'For example, allowing a
plaintiff to sue under nuisance would be in direct conflict with the SO 2
program because the remedy of an injunction would not seem to be
available against a polluter who possesses the requisite pollution rights.
If the purpose of the Clean Air Act and the marketable allowance program
is to efficiently reduce pollution to safe limits, common law claims may
come in direct conflict because even allowable or "safe" limits of
emissions may cause injuries to citizens. A company is already "paying
to pollute" by purchasing the allowances; placing additional costs on the
companies, through personal injury suits, may penalize the company
unnecessarily.
In addition, once the EPA has determined that certain emissions are
safe, the courts cannot decide differently." For example, the Supreme
Court held in Chicago & N.W. TransportationCo. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co. that the principles of implied preemption prohibit a state from
imposing common law damages on individuals who act in accordance with
a federal act or regulation.65 The reasoning was that a person cannot be
held liable for doing what a federal rule tells him to do.
A company thus could not be held liable merely for participating
in the pollution program. If a person cannot be held liable for acting in
accordance with the law by purchasing pollution rights, any pollution he
emits is also legal. Therefore, the right to pollute, established by the Clean
Air Act and its regulations, should insulate the polluter from the common
law claims.

63. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1991).

64. See Robert L. Glicksman, FederalPreemption and PrivateLegal Remedies for
Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1985). Glicksman asserted that four values reflected

in case law argue against preemption. The values are legitimacy, individual liberty,
accommodation, and efficiency. These values are essential to persons injured by pollution
and need to be properly applied by the courts. Case law holding for preemption, in his
view, misconstrued these four values.
65. 450 U.S. 311, 318 (1981).
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"Taking"Common Law Claims Through Preemption
The Constitution prohibits the government from taking private
property for public use without giving compensation, unless the taking is
justified under a valid exercise of state police power.6 A citizen's right
to redress for pollution-related battery, trespass, and nuisance harms are
property interests.67 Since the Clean Air Act preempts federal and state
common law claims, the federal government essentially has "taken"
citizens' rights to redress.
In theory, preemption of common law claims should be considered
a prima facie taking of property because it alters the distributive share an
individual possesses in the system protecting common law property and
tort rights." The EPA program under the Clean Air Act which preempts
state common law claims results in such an alteration of the system and
must be considered a taking.
Further, when a property right is taken, the Constitution requires
that just compensation be given. However, what is "just" is not clearly
defined, and monetary compensation may not be sufficient to provide an
adequate remedy to a person injured by air pollution.' In addition, one
purpose of compensation is the protection of property owners against
When accommodating conflicting
governmental discrimination. 0
not force the owner, upon whom the loss
interests, the government should
71
would fall, to bear the costs.
The government, through implementation of the Clean Air Act's
marketable allowance program, has placed the costs of pollution prevention
on non-polluting citizens. Compensation should be provided to the parties
injured by air pollution. The common law remedies exist to provide
compensation and act as a deterrent to polluters; yet preemption
necessarily renders redress unavailable to injured citizens.
CONCLUSION

The EPA program for S02 emissions allows companies to
purchase the right to pollute. Polluters not only are allowed to continue

66. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Sax, supra note 38.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Slawson, supra note 37, at 769.
See Kelman, supra note 43, at 1831.
Michelman, supra note 47, at 1112.
Sax, supra note 38, at 169.
Id.
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polluting, but they may profit by selling unused pollution rights. Other
citizens may also profit by speculating on how much pollution will be
produced in a year by playing the "pollution market."
The public trust doctrine, however, mandates that the
government preserve the air, not sell it off to be destroyed. Air is also
inherently public property; any distribution by the government of the air
must be in pursuance of the public interest. The government is best
able to bear the costs and should uphold the duty imposed under the
public trust doctrine and the public interest in the preservation of air
quality. The public interest is not served by allowing polluters to pay
for the right to pollute. The public interest is served by holding
polluters liable for the harms they cause and preserving a citizen's right
to sue for these harms. Public rights exist in the preservation of the air
and need to be enforced through common law remedies.
Citizens possess common law claims (such as battery, trespass,
and nuisance) to remedies for injuries suffered as a result of pollution.
This right to redress is a property right and should be protected at all
costs. The injuries suffered as a result of pollution should not go
uncompensated.
Yet the Clean Air Act preempts these rights and thus commits a
taking by extricating these rights from the people. The Act has
completely occupied the field of air pollution regulation. The federal
government has determined which pollutants are harmful and at what
level the pollutants are harmful. According to the government program
establishing marketable allowances for S02 emissions, a company does
not wrongfully pollute as long as the company possesses the requisite
pollution rights. Above this, the courts cannot attempt to also determine
at what level pollutants, namely sulfur dioxide, are harmful and produce
injuries for which people should be compensated.
The government, through preemption, takes these claims from
the people. Yet adequate compensation may be illusory; instead
citizens should be allowed to pursue their common law claims and seek
the remedy they wish. Courts should be able to grant injunctions,
regardless of whether or not the company was violating the Clean Air
Act. Preemption must not be allowed to occur and the Clean Air Act
should be amended to reflect the preservation of these common law
claims. The ability to purchase the right to pollute cannot be equated
with a license to cause uncompensated harm to others.

